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COMMENTARY
LOST IN THE WOODS:
THE SUPREME COURT, RACE, AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE
IN CONGRESSIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT
INTRODUCTION
We begin with the premise that we must have a government of some sort,
that the officials in that government must be elected, and that, to elect them,
we must cast votes in a structured and coherent fashion. We postulate further
that votes thus cast are to be counted and that the candidate receiving the most
votes becomes our elected official. The proposition seems straightforward; any
middle-school civics student could tell you as much. Our casual acceptance of
the political system as described, however, belies the complex interaction of
rights and protections that make up the electoral process. This process invites
a thoughtful questioning of the manner in which each of our votes is cast and
tallied. For the most part, our system operates on the assumption that a candi-
date receiving half of the votes plus one is entitled to represent the whole:
majority rules. How well the majority rules when the voting populace includes
viable and active minority interests is a question open to valid debate.
This tension becomes most apparent in the area of reapportionment.
Again, the concept is deceptively simple. For the purpose of electing represen-
tatives, individuals are grouped into geographical units. Periodically, changes
in population require the redefinition of those boundaries, and such redefini-
tions can take a variety of forms. States, while political groupings in their own
right, are divided into smaller voting units for localized matters. County com-
missioners, school board members, and other relatively low-level officials are
generally elected from "at-large," "single-member," or "multimember" dis-
tricts.' Suppose you live in Fleugerville, Wisconsin. The Fleugerville city
council is composed of three council members. All three seats are contested in
this year's election. When the time comes to choose your city councilperson,
you might cast your vote three times-once for every contested seat. If so,
Fleugerville operates under an "at-large" election scheme: each voter in the
city votes for every office. If, on the other hand, you cast only one vote for
one candidate, Fleugerville uses a "single-member district" system-that is,
the voters in the city are subdivided into three smaller geographical units, each
of which elects a single city council representative.2 Finally, if Fleugerville is
1. QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-
1990, at 7 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) [hereinafter QUIET REVOLUTION].
2. Id.
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divided into separate districts but each district elects more than one representa-
tive in an at-large fashion, the city operates under a "multimember" scheme.3
The significance of these seemingly technical distinctions is that elections are
won and lost on the basis of which people are grouped where. The subtle
placement of a congressional districting line may mean the difference between
a constitutionally fair vote and effective disenfranchisement. Whether the
result of deliberate manipulation or simple carelessness on the part of legisla-
tors, gerrymandered congressional districts jeopardize the integrity of the elec-
toral process.
Voting rights law is in crisis. Beyond all of the rhetoric, past all of the
vacillations, we have no meaningful standards for determining how candidates
should be elected in this country. If the color of a person's skin dictates how
he or she behaves in the voting booth, elections in this country are rigged,
because legislators have the power to determine the outcome of any election
simply by manipulating district lines to favor particular racial groups. This
view of the electoral process may be unduly fatalistic, however, because non-
minority candidates do get elected in minority districts and, occasionally, vice
versa. Candidates rarely make blatant racism the cornerstone of their cam-
paign, and almost never successfully.' Instead, politicians tend to run on plat-
forms embracing a variety of social, economic, and moral positions perhaps
correlated with, but not dictated by, race. This suggests a more complex rela-
tionship between voting behavior and ethnicity than the more cynical view
would seem to sustain.
This inconsistency may stem from a fundamental misunderstanding of
race and its relevancy in our society. By using terms like "black" and "white"
to designate those holding perceived common attributes and interests, we have
made skin color a shorthand for other, more salient characteristics.5 This ver-
bal laziness clouds the political process and obfuscates legitimate issues and
policy concerns. In the reapportionment arena, the use of race as a shorthand
has proven fatal to redistricting schemes in North Carolina and Georgia.6 This
3. ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES CouNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORI-
TY VOTING RIGHTS 304 (1987). Because they represent similar threats to minority voting potential,
"at-large" and "multimember" districts will be viewed interchangeably for purposes of this Com-
mentary.
4. Even the quintessential white supremacist David Duke was forced to mainstream his
message in a 1991 bid for Governor of Louisiana. Duke garnered approximately 40% of the popu-
lar vote with a platform grounded in economic reform-nde-racism. Michael Riley, The No-Win
Election, TIME, Nov. 25, 1991, at 43.
5. The author prefers a conceptualization of race similar to that envisioned by Ian F. Haney
Lopez in The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusions, Fabrication, and
Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994). Under this rubric, skin color is significant only to
the extent that it is "historically contingent" or "socially significant." Id. at 40. Rather than being
biological in origin, race-constructs are an outgrowth of chance ("morphology" and "ancestry," or
the uncontrollable variable of "what we look like or to whom we are born"), context ("the social
setting in which races are recognized, constructed, and contested"), and choices-in-context (the
"mundane and epic" self-selection of racial identity). Id. at 40-47 (emphasis added). As social
constructs, racial affiliations and identifications become powerful mechanisms for the transforma-
tion of the contexts in which they were created. Id. at 51. For example, by refusing to be grouped
into the inaccurate categories available to them, Chicano-Americans in effect "created" a new race.
Id.
6. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
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Commentary examines voting rights law in detail. Part I traces the tortuous
path establishing reapportionment as a legitimate area of judicial inquiry. Part
II brings us to a crossroads, the passage and implementation of the Voting
Rights Act. Part III discusses the recent detour cases, Shaw v. Reno7 and Mill-
er v. Johnson.! Part IV analyzes Shaw and Miller in an effort to understand
what the Court was attempting to accomplish with these decisions, and wheth-
er these goals were met. Finally, Part V examines the issues left unresolved by
case law to date, including the lingering question of whether voters might be
better served by a redefinition of our electoral process.
I. A LONG AND WINDING JOURNEY:
THE EVOLUTION OF VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA
Like the children of Israel in the Wilderness of Paran,9 the United States
Supreme Court has, for almost a generation, wandered lost in the "political
thicket"'" of congressional redistricting. Since Baker v. Carr allowed judi-
cial intervention in the reapportionment process in Tennessee after the 1960
Federal Census, 2 the Supreme Court has fumbled its way from decision to
decision, managing in the process to tangle the electoral system in this country
almost beyond redemption. In 1993, the Court wandered deeper into the
underbrush of the political thicket when it established an equal protection
cause of action for non-minority individuals. The Court, in Shaw v. Reno, 4
reasoned that voters suffer a constitutional harm when placed in districts so bi-
zarrely drawn they could rationally only have been designed to separate voters
based on race.' As lower courts and commentators struggled to follow the
Court down this meandering new path,'6 night fell in the political thicket: the
Court "clarified" equal protection doctrine in the context of political redis-
tricting. This year's decision in Miller v. Johnson7 expanded Shaw's equal
protection cause of action to include even facially regular districts where race
was the "predominant factor" in the legislature's placement of the district
lines. 8 Hence, after Miller, even congressional districts drafted in accordance
7. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
8. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
9. See Numbers 14:33. In the Biblical story of the Exodus, the Children of Israel wandered
for forty ears in the wilderness outside of Canaan before being allowed to enter the Promised
Land. Id.
10. The term is from Justice Frankfurter's infamous plurality opinion in Colegrove v. Green,
328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (finding that the Illinois House of Representatives' redistricting plan
raised a nonjusticiable "political question"). Justice Frankfurter cautioned the Court against enter-
ing this "political thicket." id.
11. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
12. Baker, 369 U.S. at 192, 197-98.
13. For a discussion of the problems inherent in our current political system, see DOUGLAS J.
AMY, REAL CHOICES, NEW VOICES: THE CASE FOR PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES (1993); see also THERNSTROM, supra note 3, at 232-44 (criticizing the
expansion of the Voting Rights Act and examining racial politics).
14. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
15. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
16. See THERNSTROM, supra note 3, at 77-78.
17. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
18. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488.
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with traditional standards of redistricting may face criticism on equal protec-
tion grounds. 9 This broadening of the scope of equal protection inquiry rep-
resents an alarming trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence. The impetus behind
the judicial movement to abolish long-standing racial bias in voting is a good
one. Unfortunately, good intentions often prove unworkable, and the Court's
enthusiasm for a color-blind society may have pushed its decisions beyond the
boundaries of common sense. Voting rights in America are at the point of
representational gridlock." The story of how this situation came to be is a
complex one, full of heroes and villains and, above all, a well-intentioned
judiciary in over its head.
A. The Gerrymander and Issues in Redistricting
The term "gerrymander" is an ugly word with a correspondingly ugly
history. The political ideology that broadly informs our concept of "voting
rights" began to solidify in 1789, when the requisite ninth state ratified the
Constitution.2 It did not take politicians long to recognize the plastic nature
of voting districts-and how best to use this manipulability to their advantage.
The first true "gerrymander" was designed for an 1812 Massachusetts congres-
sional race. When presented with a picture of the oddly-shaped district, an
artist sketched a few additions to the drawing and cried, "'That will do for a
salamander!' His editor, Benjamin Russell, replied, 'Better say a Gerryman-
der,"'-after the incumbent governor, Elbridge Gerry. 2 The concept of ma-
nipulating political boundaries to achieve particular election results became a
mainstay of American politics.23
A gerrymander may be political, racial, or both.24 Political gerrymanders,
of the sort drawn in the 1812 Massachusetts race, involve demarking the
boundaries of a given district so that a specific party-that of the incum-
bent-is virtually assured a victory in that district. As noted, political gerry-
manders have a long history in this country, and are generally considered a
constitutionally valid means of dividing the population.25 Political gerryman-
19. Id. at 2486.
20. The electoral system has been described as a state of "[1legislative paralysis," an "alto-
gether defensible result in the absence of adequate representational consensus." Daniel D. Polsby
& Robert D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry into the Problem of Racial Gerrymandering Under the
Voting Rights Act, 92 MICH. L. REV. 652, 666 (1993).
21. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (1993).
22. AMY, supra note 13, at 43.
23. See Andrew J. Clarkowski, Comment, Shaw v. Reno and Formal Districting Criteria: A
Short History of a Jurisprudence that Failed in Wisconsin, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 271, 301 n.2 (quot-
ing RICHARD L. MORRILL, POLITICAL REDISTRICTING AND GEOGRAPHIC THEORY 11 (1981)); see
also Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983) (listing the avoidance of competitions between
incumbents as a "legitimate objective" potentially justifying the creation of districts of unequal
population).
24. See Elizabeth Bachman, Note, Shooting Down the Phoenix: Shaw v. Reno and the Con-
troversy over Race-Conscious Districting, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 153, 202 (1994) (arguing that
racial gerrymandering is best treated as a form of political gerrymandering); Jeffrey G. Hamilton,
Comment, Deeper into the Political Thicket: Racial and Political Gerrymandering and the Su-
preme Court, 43 EMORY L.J. 1519, 1542 (1994) (suggesting that "where racial gerrymandering is
mandated, political gerrymandering necessarily follows").
25. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). While political and racial gerryman-
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ders may not offend equal protection principles because political classifications
do not automatically trigger heightened scrutiny. Republicans, Democrats, or
Libertarians may be grouped into districts at the legislature's discretions, pro-
vided each district's population is roughly proportional.26
More problematic is the racial gerrymander, and deservedly so. To begin
with, racial gerrymanders traditionally serve to perpetuate the systemic exclu-
sion of certain minority groups from meaningful political participation.27
Moreover, the modem Supreme Court has taken the position that all classifica-
tions based on race are presumptively unconstitutional." In particular, a state
legislature may not discriminate against members of a "suspect class," such as
African-Americans, without satisfying the highest level of judicial inquiry,
strict scrutiny.29
Racial gerrymanders affect minority voters in one of two ways. First,
certain groups may be selectively disenfranchised, as when the boundaries of
an election district are carefully drawn to exclude minorities.3" However,
even when the minority voters are not physically denied access to the polls,
they may face a more insidious threat: vote dilution. Vote dilution occurs
when the votes of a cohesive majority "swallow up" the votes of an equally
cohesive minority "in an election system to which there is a feasible alterna-
ders may be analogous in certain respects, they can also raise very different concerns. See general-
ly MARK E. RUSH, DOES REDISTRICTING MAKE A DIFFERENCE? (1993) (exploring the issues
raised by political and racial gerrymanders).
26. See Davis, 478 U.S. at 138 ("[Elven if a state legislature redistricts with the specific
intention of disadvantaging one political party's election prospects, we do not believe that there
has been an unconstitutional discrimination against members of that party unless the redistricting
does in fact disadvantage it at the polls."). The Court treats voting as a fundamental right, howev-
er, and applies "meticulous[] scrutiny" to voting restrictions. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562
(1964). See NORMAN REDLICH ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 298-300 (1995)
(citing Reynolds and suggesting that the Court is less restrictive when dealing with state and local
voting matters than congressional districts).
27. For an excellent review of voting rights case law, see Chandler Davidson, The Recent
Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting Racial and Language Minorities, in QUIET REVOLUTION,
supra note 1, at 21.
28. "A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and
can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification." Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 272 (1979) (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)). Today, the Supreme Court
will probably view any race-based classification as presumptively unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (remanding a reverse-discrimination
case to determine whether offering financial incentives to companies hiring disadvantaged subcon-
tractors was narrowly-tailored to further a compelling state interest); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (finding that Richmond's plan requiring all contractors awarded
city construction contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the value of the contract to "Minority
Business Enterprises" violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause).
29. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). Members of a
"discrete and insular" minority are those marked by some immutable characteristic which has
historically made them the subject of discrimination and limited their political power. Such minor-
ity groups enjoy suspect class status, meaning the government must satisfy the highest level of
judicial review-"strict scrutiny"-if it wishes to classify the individuals based on their minority
status. To satisfy strict scrutiny, the State must show that the classification is narrowly tailored to
further a compelling government interest. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944) (ruling that racial classifications must be reviewed under the "most rigid scrutiny").
30. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (involving a twenty-eight-sided
municipal boundary drawn to exclude virtually every African-American from the city limits of
Tuskegee, Alabama).
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tive. '" Vote dilution undermines the principle of "one man, one vote"-the
theory that each individual vote should receive no less proportional weight
than any other individual vote.32 For example, if Voter A lives in a district
containing only ten people, and Voter B lives in a district containing one
hundred people, Voter A's voting strength is ten times that of voter B. In
other words, Voter B would have to control ten votes to match the relative
strength of Voter A's vote alone. This breakfast-cereal-like comparison is
significant because one of the crucial aspects of our political system is rough
equality of voting potential. As a matter of policy, we do not allow certain
individual votes to be weighted more heavily than other individual votes. This
becomes especially pertinent to Voter B if she is a member of a minority
group, and the other ninety-nine individuals in the district are not.
Minority voting strength may be "watered down" or artificially com-
pressed. If a substantial minority voting bloc is scattered among several dis-
tricts, the minority group loses the effectiveness of its bloc vote. Conversely,
if all the minority voters in the area are "packed" into a single district, the
ability of the minority voters to influence the outcome of other elections is
severely diminished." Intuitively, both of these practices seem unfair. Murki-
er is the question of whether a cognizable harm occurs when the manipulation
of district lines results in a member of the overall majority casting a minority
vote solely because of the way the political boundaries are drawn. In its most
basic form, the question becomes: When a state legislature deliberately designs
a district to the advantage of African-American candidates, do the "white"
voters in the district suffer a constitutional harm? The United States Supreme
Court says they do.34
The issue is clear enough in its traditional context. We can all picture a
room full of good-ol'-boy politicians, stripped to their shirtsleeves, sitting
around a map of, say, Georgia, and winkingly agreeing between puffs of their
cigars that there should be no "nigger districts."35 We can all agree that this
is wrong. It is harder to acknowledge that a group of well-meaning and pre-
sumably more enlightened legislators, acting under the auspices of the Justice
Department, could inflict an equally cognizable harm on non-minority voters
in districts drawn for the explicit purpose of giving the traditionally
underrepresented a voice in congressional politics.
31. Davidson, supra note 27, at 23.
32. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
33. Davidson, supra note 27, at 23.
34. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2494
(1995).
35. This statement was made during the 1982 campaign to block the creation of the first
majority-minority district in Georgia. The comment was made by then-chairman of the Georgia
House Reapportionment Committee, Joe Mack Wilson. Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 501
(D.D.C. 1982), quoted in Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2501-02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 73:1
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B. Early Redistricting Decisions: A Judicial Fairy Tale
Certain things fall within the scope of judicial review, and certain things
do not. The Supreme Court initially placed matters of political redistricting in
the latter category. By designating questions of reapportionment as "political,"
the Court was able to successfully skirt the political thicket until 1961. 6 The
political question doctrine grew out of the Court's early interpretation of Arti-
cle I, section 4, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he Times, Places,
and Manner of holding Elections ... shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof,"" as rendering apportionment questions nonjusticiable. In
Colegrove v. Green,38 the Court refused to adjudicate a claim that gradual
changes in population had rendered congressional districts in Illinois uncon-
stitutional because they now lacked compactness and approximate equality of
population. In a plurality opinion, Justice Frankfurter expressed an aversion to
the idea of "an appeal to the federal courts to reconstruct the electoral pro-
cess" of a given state." Justice Frankfurter described reapportionment as an
issue of a "peculiarly political nature" and stated unequivocally: "Nothing is
clearer than that this controversy concerns matters that bring courts into imme-
diate and active relations with party contests.... It is hostile to a democratic
system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people."''0 Justice Frank-
furter viewed judicial intervention as unnecessary because the Constitution
conferred the duty of securing fair representation on the states. Even if Con-
gress neglected that duty to the point it "offended" the "standards of fairness,"
the judiciary was forbidden from intervening because reapportionment was by
definition political." Frankfurter's summarization of the issue is probably the
most-quoted passage in Congressional redistricting law: "To sustain this action
would cut very deep into the very being of Congress. Courts ought not to
enter this political thicket. The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure
State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers
of Congress."42 Justice Rutledge, in a concurring opinion, stated the issue
more bluntly: "There is not, and could not be except abstractly, a right of
absolute equality in voting."43 Citing the great latitude granted state legisla-
tures in making apportionment decisions, Justice Rutledge continued, "The
right here is not absolute. And the cure sought may be worse than the dis-
ease.""
The path open to the Court after Colegrove seemed clear: Districting is
political, and political matters do not fall within the purview of the judiciary.
Like Little Red Riding Hood, however, the Court was soon to stray from the
36. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1961) (describing characteristics typical of
political questions).
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
38. 328 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1946) (plurality opinion).
39. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 552.
40. Id. at 553-54.
41. Id. at 552-54.
42. Id. at 556.
43. Id. at 566 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
44. Id.
1995]
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well-marked path. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Colegrove foreshad-
owed the emergence of the vote dilution claim:
Petitioners claim that since they live in the heavily populated districts
their vote is much less effective than the vote of those living in a
district which.., is also allowed to choose one Congressman, though
its population is sometimes only one-ninth that of the heavily populat-
ed districts .... [T]his reduction of the effectiveness of their vote...
amounts to a denial of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment .... [T]he right to have their vote count-
ed is abridged unless that vote is given approximately equal weight to
that of other citizens. 5
For the dissenters, destroying the effectiveness of the plaintiffs' vote was
tantamount to denying them the vote altogether. Thus, the issue crept beyond
the boundaries of the political question doctrine into the arena of constitutional
protections.' To dismiss a clear constitutional inequity as "political," the
dissenters felt, was to endorse semantics over substance.47
The dissenters in Colegrove had the moral high ground, and the appropri-
ate case for proving it came in 1960. Gomillion v. Lightfoot' involved a
1957 Act of the Alabama legislature which redrew the boundaries of
Tuskeegee, Alabama, to exclude all but four or five African-Americans from
residency.49 The legislative act was clearly discriminatory. The "strangely
irregular twenty-eight-sided figure"5 it created was patently indefensible as a
municipal boundary, and the Court rightly allowed the claim.5 In the majori-
ty opinion, Justice Frankfurter distinguished the facts of Gomillion from those
of Colegrove. In Gomillion, the Alabama legislature had "single[d] out" and
discriminated against an identifiable racial minority. 2 In Colegrove, by con-
trast, the disparity in voting strength had developed gradually over a period of
time, a product of "benign neglect" on the part of the state legislature. The
Gomillion Court focused on the active nature of the harm: "While in form this
is merely an act redefining metes and bounds ... the inescapable human
effect of this essay in geometry and geography is to despoil colored citizens,
and only colored citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights. That was
no Colegrove v. Green."54
45. Id. at 567-68 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
46. Id. at 567-69. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "No
State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifteenth Amendment states: "The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged ... by any State on account of race, color, or previ-
ous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
47. See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 572-73.
48. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
49. GomilIion, 364 U.S. at 341.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 347-48.
52. Id. at 346.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 347.
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Gomillion made problematic law. Although the service of justice in the
particular case demanded Court intervention, Gomillion opened a Pandora's
box of potential litigation. This became apparent with the next milestone case
in redistricting litigation, Baker v. Carr." Argued only one year after the
Gomillion decision, Baker was a brave new world of apportionment adjudica-
tion. In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court held that
the issue of whether Tennessee's reapportionment plan violated the Fourteenth
Amendment was justiciable in that it arose under the Constitution. 6 The
Court examined the parameters of the political question doctrine and found
reapportionment to be a matter of political "cases," not "questions,"57 mean-
ing reapportionment was no longer beyond the judicial pale. In Colegrove, the
Court had rather summarily drawn the contours of the political question doc-
trine to exclude consideration of reapportionment issues. 8 In Baker, the
Court as uncritically rechalked the lines of justiciability to include reappor-
tionment within the scope of judicial review. 9 In neither case did the Court
articulate a satisfying explanation for the contradictory outcomes.
In Reynolds v. Sims,' the last major case before the passage of the Vot-
ing Rights Act, the Court examined the constitutionality of legislative appor-
tionment in Alabama.6 The Alabama Constitution, drafted in 1901, estab-
lished a set maximum of thirty-five senators and one-hundred and five repre-
sentatives, to be apportioned according to the 1900 Census figures.62 The
State constitution called for reapportionment following every decennial census;
however, as of 1961, Alabama had not modified its districting scheme since
1903, when it added one additional House seat.63 Chief Justice Warren's suc-
cinct statement, "[L]egislators represent people, not trees or acres''64 answered
the question of whether a district's population or its square footage is determi-
native for the purposes of reapportionment. The Court found Alabama's cur-
rent districting plan and two proposed plans invalid under the Equal Protection
55. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
56. Baker, 369 U.S. at 198-99.
57. According to the Baker Court, political questions involve issues which: (1) have been
delegated by the Constitution "to a coordinate political department"; (2) lack "judicially discover-
able and manageable standards for resolving"; (3) involve an "initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion"; (4) cannot be undertaken without showing a "lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government"; (5) show "an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made"; or (6) could lead to "embarrassment from multi-
farious pronouncements by various departments on one question." Id. at 217.
58. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 553-56.
59. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
60. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
61. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561.
62. Id. at 538-40.
63. Id. at 538-39.
64. Id. at 562. Interestingly, only one year later "white" plaintiffs in Georgia brought suit
arguing that the state's use of both multimember and single-member districts resulted in their re-
ceiving unfair representation. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). While the Court denied the
plaintiff's claim, it did note the problems with multimember elections in general. Id. at 439.
Multimember districts include elements of both at-large and single-member districts. Because they
involve electing more than one representative per district, they share the problem of minority vote
dilution with at-large districts. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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Clause, and stated that the current plan and one proposed version were "crazy-
quilts, completely lacking in rationality."65
At this point, then, the Supreme Court could review districting schemes to
ensure they neither abridged the right of minorities to vote under the Fifteenth
Amendment nor diluted minority voting strength under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' The Court had thus expanded the scope of judicial review to offer
minorities protection against only the most grievous bars to enfranchisement.
Times were changing, however, and the comparatively meager guarantees
found within the black-letter text of the Constitution proved increasingly unsat-
isfactory to progressive thinkers of all races. In 1965, the political climate was
ripe for activism, and the Civil Rights Movement found its Crusade in the
Voting Rights Act.
II. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
The Voting Rights Act (VRA) 67 is perhaps second only to the Constitu-
tion in securing for traditionally disempowered minority voters something
approximating equality in the voting booth.6' Although originally proposed as
early as 1959,69 the final version of the VRA was not signed into law until
August 6, 1965.70 Congress passed the VRA, in part, because the states had
continued in "unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution."'" The
VRA targeted Southern states-"states with dirty hands on the question of
race" 72 -namely Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina,
Virginia, and parts of North Carolina." It also abolished literacy tests,
grandfather clauses, and similar obstacles to suffrage in areas where less than
half of the voting-age population was registered to vote as of November 1,
1965, or where less than fifty percent of the registered voters had voted in the
1964 presidential election.74 In addition, section 5 of the Act required South-
ern states to obtain preclearance from the Attorney General of any proposed
65. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568.
66. See supra note 46.
67. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973gg-10 (1988 & Supp. V 1994)).
68. See Davidson, supra note 27, at 21 ("The voting fights of American ethnic minority
groups are guaranteed primarily by two documents: The United States Constitution ... and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965."); see also HUGH D. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 171 (1990)
(describing the Voting Rights Act as "radical in design and extraordinarily effective in enfranchis-
ing the southern blacks who were its intended beneficiaries").
69. GRAHAM, supra note 68, at 164.
70. Id. at 173; see Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. at 446. The VRA was the product of both a
sympathetic Congress and President Johnson's skillful maneuvering in the face of the massacre at
Selma. GRAHAM, supra note 68, at 166-67. The civil rights demonstrations in Selma, Alabama,
led by Martin Luther King, Jr., precipitated a violent reaction which left two civil rights protestors
dead and over forty injured. Id. at 164-66. In addition, August, 1965, was marked by violent un-
rest in Los Angeles. The "Watts Riots" left 34 dead, 930 injured, and resulted in approximately
$40,000,000 in property damage (adjusted for 1992 inflation rates). KEITH BEA & DAVID
TEASLEY, AMERICAN NAT'L GOV'T, GOV'T DIV., URBAN RIOTS AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE: AN
OVERVIEW 3 (1992).
71. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966).
72. THERNSTROM, supra note 3, at 4.
73. Davidson, supra note 27, at 30-31.
74. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4.
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changes to voting rules, to ensure that such changes would not have the effect
of abridging minority voting rights.7" Finally, sections 6, 7, and 8 authorized
the Attorney General to appoint voting examiners and observers to monitor the
states' implementation of the measures.76
A. Judicial Interpretation and Expansion of the VRA
The Court viewed the VRA as "an array of potent weapons" for the battle
against discrimination." In ruling on the constitutionality of the Act only two
years later, Chief Justice Warren lauded Congress for its efforts to eliminate
the "insidious and pervasive evil" of systemic discrimination." Originally, the
Act may have been intended only to remedy the most blatant procedural
wrongs aimed at keeping minorities from physically casting a ballot. 79 In Al-
len v. State Board of Elections,' however, the majority, lead by Chief Justice
Warren, expanded the scope of the VRA to include the "practice, or proce-
dure" of replacing single-district schemes with at-large elections for county
commission seats.8' The Chief Justice noted the danger of minority vote dilu-
tion in at-large elections and likened the inability of a minority group to "elect
a candidate of [its] choice" to "an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot."82
The effect in each case is the same: the individual voter of color is left, at
best, a muffled voice in the halls of power.
The Allen decision had a number of significant ramifications, both good
and bad. Most importantly, the decision opened the door to "unprecedented
federal involvement in local electoral matters,"8 giving the federal govern-
ment the right-if not the obligation-to "define racial equity-the point at
which black ballots 'fully' count.' 84 Thus, the Court reshaped the VRA into
"an instrument for affirmative action in the electoral sphere."8 When subse-
quent cases acknowledged that inequities in black educational opportunities
rendered literacy tests inherently disenfranchising86 and suggested that
multimember districts might be unconstitutional altogether,87 the VRA be-
came a powerful tool for remediation in the arena of voting rights.
75. Id. § 5.
76. Id. §§ 6-8.
77. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 337.
78. Id. at 315, 309.
79. See, e.g., THERNSTROM, supra note 3, at 22 (describing the goals and scope of the
VRA).
80. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
81. Allen, 393 U.S. at 569-71. Nothing in the ruling required the elimination of existing at-
large schemes, however.
82. Id. at 569. Minority voters will by definition always be outnumbered if their votes are
simply counted against the votes of the majority. In a district composed of 70,000 "white" voters
and 30,000 "non-white" voters, the "white" voters will always win if race is the definitive predic-
tor of voting behavior.
83. THERNSTROM, supra note 3, at 25.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 27.
86. Gaston County, N.C. v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 293 (1969).
87. Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966).
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Then, in Whitcomb v. Chavis," a group of African-American plaintiffs
alleged that Indiana's multimember district electoral system operated to keep
the number of minority officeholders disproportionately low. 9 The Supreme
Court disagreed, ruling that the plaintiffs had suffered only "political defeat,"
not racial discrimination." Two years later, however, in White v. Regester,"
the Court allowed a challenge to a multimember reapportionment plan.92 In
allowing a claim against the 1970 redistricting plan for the Texas House of
Representatives, the Court cited the long history of discrimination against
Mexican-Americans in Texas and the de facto "cultural and language barrier"
between Anglo-Americans and Mexican-Americans.93
Using the VRA, the Court was thus able to limit even relatively subtle
discrimination on the state level. The VRA clearly barred any form of vote
dilution, including the blatant manipulation of district lines to pack or exclude
minority voters, as well as the use of at-large elections to submerge minority
voting strength. The Court in White acknowledged that a particular voter under
a particular set of circumstances may be able to show a cognizable claim of
racial discrimination. Chavis indicated that the VRA did have boundaries,
however: in a fair election, no individual voter has a constitutional right to
win.
B. Early Amendments to the VRA and Subsequent Case Law
In 1970, Congress extended the ban on literacy tests by another five years
and expanded "covered states" to include any state which had below a fifty-
percent voter turnout in the 1968 election, regardless of whether the state had
a history of racial discrimination.94 In 1975, Congress demonstrated that race
itself was not the only pertinent consideration in voting rights analysis when it
added a "language-minority trigger formula" to the VRA.95 This new
"trigger" required jurisdictions to provide bilingual election materials if the
following three criteria were met: (1) more than five percent of the voting-age
citizens belonged to a single-language minority group (defined as Asian-Amer-
ican, American-Indian, Alaskan-native, or "of Spanish heritage"); (2) fewer
than fifty percent of the voting-age citizens had voted in the 1972 election;
and (3) the 1972 election had been conducted only in English.96
88. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
89. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 124-25.
90. Id. at 153. In Whitcomb, the Supreme Court overturned the ruling of the district court
sitting in Indianapolis. The three-judge panel included Judge Otto Kerner, author of the famous
"Kemer Report" which described America circa 1968 as "two societies, one black, one
white-separate and unequal." THERNSTROM, supra note 3, at 67-68 (quoting REPORT OF THE NA-
T'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 10 (1968)).
91. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
92. White, 412 U.S. at 755.
93. Id. at 768.
94. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 4, 84 Stat. 314, 315
(1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1988)); THERNSTROM, supra note 3, at 33-34.
95. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73 §§ 201-08, 301, 89 Stat.
400, 400-03 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973aa-la (1988 & Supp. V
1994)).
96. Id. The states primarily impacted by this Amendment were Alaska and Texas. Davidson,
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Post-1975 litigation, however, paints an increasingly confusing picture of
voting rights protections. In 1975, Justice Blackmun suggested that voters in
multimember districts could bring an equal protection claim if they could
prove they were being "denied access to the political process equal to the
access of other groups";97 however, "simple disproportionality between the
voting potential and the legislative seats won by a racial or political group"
was not enough.9 One year later, in Beer v. United States,' the Court set a
"nonretrogression" standard for determining whether a reapportionment plan
complies with section 5 of the VRA: so long as the new legislative apportion-
ment does not reduce the representation of racial minorities, no section 5
violation occurs.""' In ruling that a New Orleans city council district satisfied
the VRA because it created one black-majority district where none had been
previously, the Court explicitly rejected the idea that "members of a minority
group have a federal right to be represented in legislative bodies in proportion
to their numbers in the general population."' ..
Finally, in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey (UJO),0 2 the Court
disallowed the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment claims of a group of
Hasidic Jews who were split between two districts in an effort to create "sub-
stantial nonwhite majorities" in the districts.' Justices White, Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stevens found convincing the argument that a community of
some 30,000 Hasidic Jews was "white"-nothing more-for the purpose of
drawing state senate and assembly districts." 4 Using this assumption as its
baseline, the plurality ruled that, although in "individual districts" the appor-
tionment plan diminished the chances that the "white [Jewish] voters would be
represented by a member of their own race," no discrimination had occurred
so long as "whites in Kings County, as a group" received adequate representa-
tion." 5 Justice White rejected the idea that race is always an impermissible
criteria for drawing district lines in compliance with the VRA."'° In particu-
lar, he felt that the petitioners had suffered no harm from the redistricting
because the state's plan "represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to
whites or any other race."' 7 The Court, seemingly unsympathetic to the
plight of the Jewish voters, stated:
Where it occurs, voting for or against a candidate because of his race
is an unfortunate practice. But it is not rare; and in any district where
it regularly happens, it is unlikely that any candidate will be elected
who is a member of the race that is in the minority in that district.
supra note 27, at 31.
97. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 17 (1975).
98. Id.
99. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
100. Beer, 425 U.S. at 141-42.
101. Id. at 137 n.8 (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971)). Some scholars disagree
with this position. See infra notes 275-300 and accompanying text.
102. 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (plurality opinion).
103. UJO, 430 U.S. at 152, 162.
104. Id. at 151-52.
105. Id. at 166.
106. Id. at 161.
107. Id. at 165.
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However disagreeable this result may be, there is no authority for the
proposition that the candidates who are found racially unacceptable
by the majority, and the minority voters supporting those candidates,
have had their Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment rights infringed by
this process. Their position is similar to that of the Democratic or
Republican minority that is submerged year after year by the adher-
ents to the majority party who tend to vote a straight party line. °8
Justice Brennan's concurrence expressed concern over the use of an "overt
racial number" to assign voters to districts."° In his view, "the Justice
Department's unofficial instruction to state officials effectively resulted in an
explicit process of assignment to voting districts pursuant to race."' ..
In UJO, the majority erected a shaky ladder on sloping ground. They
began with the premise that there are two types of voters-white and non-
white. As Chief Justice Burger pointed out in dissent, "whites" for the purpose
of districting included "a veritable galaxy of national origins, ethnic back-
grounds, and religious denominations," while "'nonwhites"' included both
African-Americans and Puerto-Rican-Americans."' Having set up this di-
chotomy, however, the majority was forced to work within its confines. The
majority's treatment of the issue begged the question of which characteristic
the Jewish voters themselves viewed as salient-the color of their skin, or their
adherence to a unique and separatist system of religious belief."2
From 1970 to 1980, voting rights law reflected a curious blend of judicial
activism and inertia. The VRA continued to grow in importance and accep-
tance with each passing year, and, by 1980, covered a variety of minority
groups and states not contemplated in the original Act. On the other hand, cas-
es like UJO suggested that the judiciary had still not come to a full apprecia-
tion of minority voting concerns.
C. The 1982 Amendment and Judicial Standards
In response to the position taken by the Supreme Court in City of Mobile
v. Bolden,"3 Congress in 1982 amended the VRA. In Bolden, African-Amer-
icans living in Mobile, Alabama, brought suit as a class challenging the at-
large districting scheme for the city's governing commission." ' A fractured
Court ruled that the Fifteenth Amendment did not countenance claims of vote
dilution absent discriminatory intent on the part of the state legislature."5
The Court viewed the scope of the Fifteenth Amendment narrowly: "[I]t
108. Id. at 166-67.
109. Id. at 169 (Brennan, J., concurring).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 185 (Burger, J., dissenting).
112. The Supreme Court has elsewhere addressed the issue of "religious gerrymandering."
See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2494
(1994) (plurality opinion) (finding special school district drawn to exclude all but practitioners of
Satmar Hasidim Judaism unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause).
113. 446U.S. 55 (1980).
114. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 58.
115. Id. at 65.
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imposes but one limitation on the powers of the States. It forbids them to dis-
criminate against Negroes in matters having to do with voting.""' 6 Because
the Fifteenth Amendment "does not entail the right to have Negro candidates
elected," the plaintiffs' voting rights had not been abridged."'
Faced with intense pressure from civil liberties groups,"8 Congress
amended the VRA so that it covered any voting measure that resulted in a
lessened opportunity for equal voting on the part of minorities, whether or not
the state legislature had explicitly intended such a result."9 Additionally, the
amended Act explicitly excluded any cause of action based on the right to
proportional representation.'2"
The first-and arguably last-hint of manageable standards for judicial
review in apportionment cases came in 1986. In Thornburg v. Gingles,"' the
Court defined three standards for determining whether a given minority group
had a cognizable vote dilution claim.'22 First, the minority group must be
"sufficiently large and geographically compact" to constitute a majority-mi-
nority district. 2' Second, the group must be "politically cohesive," meaning
that, as a group, the minority members tend to display common preferences
for given candidates.'24 Finally, the group must show that the majority in the
district votes in a polarized manner, "usually" defeating the minority-preferred
candidate.'25 Gingles was decided in the context of "at-large" or
"multimember" elections.'26 In at-large elections,'27 all of the individuals in
116. Id. at61.
117. Id. at65.
118. ACLU, REAFFIRMATION OR REQUIEM FOR THE VOTING RIGHTs ACT? THE COURT WILL
DECIDE 4 (1995); see also Davidson, supra note 27, at 34 (discussing the ACLU's influence on
the 1982 amendments, which eliminated the Court mandated intent requirement in claims of dis-
criminatory reapportionment). Under the 1982 Amendments, minorities seeking to challenge a
redistricting plan on VRA-grounds needed to show only discriminatory result, not discriminatory
purpose. Id.
119. As amended in 1982, Section I-A of the Voting Rights act read:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color....
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances,
it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citi-
zens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representa-
tives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elect-
ed to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be con-
sidered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 134 (1982) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)).
120. Id.; see also Davidson, supra note 27, at 35 (discussing the 1982 Amendments to the
VRA).
121. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
122. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50.




126. Id. at 35-38.
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a political jurisdiction vote for every candidate. Thus, the minority votes are
usually "swallowed up" by the majority. The typical solution to this problem
is to create single-member districts--discrete districts within the larger politi-
cal unit. As discussed below, however, single-member districts raise their own
unique set of constitutional concerns.
III. THE FOREST PRIMEVAL: SHAW V. RENO AND MILLER V. JOHNSON
A. Shaw v. Reno: The Road Less Traveled'
28
Until Shaw v. Reno, 129 the progression of voting rights law in this coun-
try was comprehensible, if not straightforward. In the beginning, reapportion-
ment was judicially off limits. As the Court and society changed, however, it
became an acceptable-and then preferred-vehicle for judicial activism. In
1993, however, the current Court embarked on a strange sidetrip in the voting
rights journey. The focus of litigation shifted from minority to non-minority
concerns, with a favorable response from the Court. Thus, as Abigail
Thernstrom writes:
We have arrived at a point no one envisioned in 1965. The right
to vote no longer means simply the right to enter a polling booth and
pull the lever. Yet the issue retains a simple Fifteenth Amendment
aura-an aura that is pure camouflage. An alleged voting violation
today is a districting plan that contains nine majority-black districts
when a tenth could be drawn. The question is: how much special
protection from white competition are blacks entitled to?
13
Shaw was a landmark redistricting decision.'' The facts were undisputed.
The 1990 Census showed that population increases in North Carolina entitled
it to a twelfth seat in the House of Representatives.'32 A redistricting plan
creating only one majority-minority district was rejected by the U.S. Attorney
General under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The ultimate creation of a
second majority-minority district, drawn in a "dramatically irregular shape,"
prompted five voters split among Districts 2 and 12 to bring a constitutional
challenge to the new districting plan in district court.'33
127. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
128. Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, in 2 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN
LITERATURE 1099 (1989). The last stanza of the poem may well describe the Supreme Court's
entire foray into the political thicket:
I shall be telling this with a sigh
Somewhere ages and ages hence:
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I-
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.
129. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
130. THERNSTROM, supra note 3, at 5 (citations omitted).
131. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion; Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens
each filed dissenting opinions.
132. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2819.
133. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D. N.C. 1992), remanded sub nom. Shaw v. Reno,
113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), and affd sub nom. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. N.C. 1994).
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The district court took judicial notice of the fact that the appellants were
"white."' 34 Because the voting strength of the appellants had not been diluted
on a state level, the district court found no basis to support the plaintiffs'
equal protection claim.'35 Chief Judge Voorhees, while agreeing that race-
conscious redistricting was not always unconstitutional, nevertheless dissented
from the majority's equal protection analysis, based on his reading of
UJO. "' In particular, Judge Voorhees felt that race was an acceptable basis
for redistricting only when considered in conjunction with other, more tradi-
tional principles of design, such as compactness and contiguity. 7
The United States Supreme Court seemed to agree with Judge Voorhees'
dissent. The Court held that the appellants stated a valid claim, noting that the
reapportionment plan used by the North Carolina General Assembly was "so
irrational on its face" that it could only be viewed as an attempt to "segregate
voters" based on race.' 38 The appellants in Shaw complained that such segre-
gation "violated their constitutional right to participate in a 'color-blind' elec-
toral process." The Court implied that no such right existed,'39 and cited
Wright v. Rockefeller' as an example of race-conscious districting that did
not "lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination."' In Wright, non-
white voters in New York complained that they had been concentrated into
only one of four congressional districts.'42 Because the district's design
could be explained on grounds other than race-the minority voters lived in a
geographically compact area, and the state legislature would have been hard-
pressed to design a district that did not group them together-the Supreme
Court ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of proof.'43 In
contrast, the Court characterized the Shaw-appellants' complaint as being
against the unjustified segregation of voters into racially-based voting dis-
tricts.'" The Court found the equal protection claim, thus framed, valid.'45
134. Id. at 470.
135. Id. at 473.
136. Id. at 474 (Voorhees, C.J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 475-76. The district at question in Shaw violated every traditional principle of
redistricting. It wound across the state along the 1-85 corridor, prompting state legislator Mickey
Michaux to quip, "If you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of
the people in the district." Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2502 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Joan Biskupic, N.C. Case to Post Test of Racial Redistricting: White Voters Challenge
Black-Majority Map, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1993, at A4).
138. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832. However, the Court's assumption may be a faulty one. "Bi-
zarre" congressional districting lines may be drawn for a variety of reasons unrelated to the race
of the constituents. See Melissa E. Austin, Comment, Shaw v. Reno: A Beginning for Color-Blind
Reapportionment, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 495, 510 (suggesting that the lines in Shaw
could have been drawn to protect incumbents) (citing GEORGE F. WILL, RESTORATION 48 (1992)).
139. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832. "[Alppellants appear to concede that race-conscious districting
is not always unconstitutional .... That concession is wise: This Court never has held that race-
conscious state decisionmaking is impermissible in all circumstances." Id. (footnotes omitted).
140. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
141. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826.
142. Wright, 376 U.S. at 53-54.
143. Id. at 56-58.
144. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
145. Id.
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Express racial classifications trigger strict scrutiny; that is, they must be
narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest." In addition, even
apparently race-neutral statutes are subject to strict scrutiny if they are facially
"unexplainable on grounds other than race.""'c Boundaries may legitimately
be drawn "to provide for compact districts of contiguous territory, or to main-
tain the integrity of political subdivisions. '"" Compactness, contiguity, and
respect for political subdivisions are "objective factors" that will help defeat a
gerrymandering claim. They are not, however, constitutionally required fac-
tors. 49 As Justice O'Connor wrote, "reapportionment is one area in which
appearances do matter."'' Thus, the facial appearance of a congressional
district may imply the presence of racial considerations in its construction.
According to the Court, drawing district lines to include "members of the
same racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the
community in which they live" produces a two-fold harm. First, it reinforces
the unacceptable racial stereotype that all African-Americans think alike be-
cause they are African-American.' 5' Second, racially-motivated districting
encourages polarized voting which, in turn, encourages candidates to "play" to
their political base: "When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate
the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more
likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members
of that group .... This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative
democracy."'52 Justice O'Connor cited favorably the dissenting opinion by
Justice Douglas in Wright v. Rockefeller' 3 :
Here the individual is important, not his race, his creed, or his color.
The principle of equality is at war with the notion that District A
must be represented by a Negro, as it is with the notion that District
B must be represented by a Caucasian, District C by a Jew, District
D by a Catholic, and so on .... That system, by whatever name it is
called, is a divisive force in a community, emphasizing differences
between candidates and voters that are irrelevant in the constitutional
sense.'
54
In ruling that UJO'5 did not apply, the majority stated: "Nothing in the
decision precludes white voters (or voters of any other race) from bringing the
analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be
146. Id. at 2825.
147. Id. (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977)).
148. Id. at 2827. The Court cited Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578, for the proposition that these are
legitimate state interests. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. The Court notes that such distinctions have been ruled impermissible in other legal
contexts. See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 n.2 (1990) (presuming black jurors are
partial simply because of their race is unconstitutional).
152. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
153. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
154. Wright, 376 U.S. at 66 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 102-10 (UJO involved Hasidic Jews denied Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendment claims because of their non-minority status.).
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understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate
voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification." 56 Distin-
guishing between "what the law permits, and what it requires,""' Justice
O'Connor took the position that "narrowly tailored" meant no retrogression.
Any plan that included minority gains would thus not be narrowly tailored to
satisfy the VRA.'58 As O'Connor noted:
[O]nly three Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a
significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc
voting apart from the requirements of the [VRA]. And those three
Justices specifically concluded that race-based districting, as a re-
sponse to racially polarized voting, is constitutionally permissible only
when the State "employ[s] sound districting principles," and only
when the affected racial group's "residential patterns afford the op-
portunity of creating districts in which they will be in the majori-
ty .' 
59
In dissent, Justices White, Blackmun and Stevens expressed a hope that
the holding of Shaw would be restricted to "anomalous circumstances" such as
those present in the North Carolina reapportionment plan.'" The dissenters
argued that the facts of Shaw were similar to those in UJO, and that neither
group could "plausibly argue that their influence over the political process had
been unfairly canceled."'' In neither case were the plaintiffs as "whites"
removed from an overall majoritarian role in the political process.'62 Thus,
they suffered no constitutionally cognizable harm. 6 '
Shaw specifically allows plaintiffs to bring an equal protection claim when
a reapportionment statute, although facially neutral, "cannot be understood as
anything other than an [unjustified] effort to separate voters into different
districts on the basis of race."'6 4 This new "Shaw claim" is "analytically dis-
tinct" from that of vote dilution, because the wrong addressed is that of explic-
itly classifying individuals by race-as opposed to inadvertently reducing the
efficacy of certain votes simply because they happen to be in the minority.'65
Strict scrutiny attaches even with apparently "benign" districting-districting
which acts to increase rather than decrease minority representation-because
the nature of such classifications is not apparent without probing the intent of
156. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2829-30 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 2830.
158. Id. at 2831.
159. Id. (quoting United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1977) (White,
J., dissenting)).
160. Id. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting).
161. Id.
162. Id. "White" voters still constituted a majority in ten (83%) of the twelve total congressio-
nal districts. The fact that they might now find themselves consistently supporting a losing candi-
date was no more than "a lot shared by many, including a disproportionate number of minority
voters." Id. at 2838.
163. ld. at 2842.
164. Id. at 2828.
165. Id. at 2828-29.
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the statute." In addition, racial bloc voting must be proven in each case,
and may never be assumed.'67
B. Miller v. Johnson: 6s The Woods Are Lovely, Dark and Deep . . .
Following the 1990 Census, Georgia engaged in a redistricting plan to add
one congressional seat. As required by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 7'
the legislature sought preclearance of its redistricting plan from the U.S. De-
partment of Justice. The Justice Department refused to grant preclearance to
the original plan, which included two majority-minority districts, the Fifth and
the Eleventh, as well as a new Second District with a thirty-five percent Afri-
can-American voting-age population, on January 21, 1992.' A second plan,
which increased the African-American population of the three previously-men-
tioned districts, was also rejected. The plan finally accepted by the Justice
Department created three majority-minority districts, the Eleventh, Fifth, and
Second. The Eleventh District, described as a "monstrosity,"' 2 connected the
"black neighborhoods of metropolitan Atlanta and the poor black populace of
coastal Chatham County, though 260 miles apart in distance and worlds apart
in culture."' 7 3 Black candidates from each of the three majority-minority dis-
tricts were elected within one year of the redistricting, on November 4,
1992.1
4
A group of five white voters from the Eleventh District brought suit on
January 13, 1994, alleging that Georgia's redistricting plan violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution as interpreted by the Court in Shaw.'
By a vote of two to one, a district court panel found the Eleventh District
invalid. The court concluded that Shaw requires strict scrutiny whenever race
was the "predominant factor" in drawing the lines of a congressional district.
Although compliance with the Voting Rights Act would constitute a compel-
166. Id. at 2824 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
167. Id. at 2830. For an example of the techniques used to prove racial bloc voting, see Garza
v. Los Angeles, 756 F. Supp. 1298 (1990). The majority's refusal to assume racial bloc voting
indicates some acknowledgement that race does not alone control voting behavior. If this is true,
the question becomes whether "white" voters would necessarily be disadvantaged by placement in
a majority-minority district.
168. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
169. Robert Frost, Stopping By the Woods on a Snowy Evening, in 2 THE NORTON
ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE, supra note 128, at 1103. Again, the final stanza of this
poem might serve as a reminder to the current Court of its duty in voting rights law:
The woods are lovely, dark and deep.
But I have promises to keep,
And miles to go before I sleep.
And miles to go before I sleep.
170. See supra text accompanying note 75.
171. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483.
172. Id. at 2484 (quoting MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 356 (1994).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2485.
175. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1359 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (per curiam), affd, 115 S.
Ct. 2475 (1993).
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ling state interest, such compliance did not require the creation of three major-
ity-minority districts.'76
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that plaintiffs seeking
to bring an equal protection claim in the context of redistricting must demon-
strate that the redistricting plan in question subordinated nonracial districting
principles to racial concerns.' The plaintiffs in such a case are not limited
to direct evidence of legislative purpose, nor are they required to show that the
district is bizarre on its face. However, circumstantial evidence of the district's
shape and racial makeup is persuasive toward proving that traditional
districting principles were given less weight than race in drawing the district
lines. ' s Subsumed in this holding is the idea that maximizing minority vot-
ing potential in a state necessarily subordinates traditional districting principles
to racial concerns, and that this type of minority-maximization goes far beyond
the requirements of the VRA.
I. The Miller Majority
The majority, Justice Kennedy joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor,
Scalia, and Thomas, began with an analysis of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Central to the guarantee of "equal protection of
the laws," reasoned the majority, is the mandate that governmental
decisionmaking be racially neutral.' 79 Because the goal is one of neutrality,
not remediation, distinctions based on race are subject to strict scrutiny regard-
less of the racial group they benefit. 8 ° To satisfy strict scrutiny, racial dis-
tinctions must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.'
The majority then moved into a discussion of Shaw v. Reno.'82 After
noting the delicate nature of equal protection analysis, the Court stated that
facially-neutral district plans "unexplainable on grounds other than race" are
subject to strict scrutiny.'83 The Court noted that the claim created in Shaw
is "analytically distinct" from that of vote dilution and provides a cause of
action if the state used race as a basis for dividing voters.'84 The Court then
applied the principles from Shaw to Georgia's redistricting plan.
85
The Court first outlined the facts and procedural posture of the case.'86
In explaining its understanding of equal protection mandates, the majority
cited favorably from Justice O'Connor's dissent in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC.'87 In Metro Broadcasting, Justice O'Connor had stated that the Equal
176. Id. at 1373, 1379.
177. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2481.
178. Id. at 2486.
179. Id. at 2482.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2483.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2485-86.
185. Id. at 2483.
186. Id. at 2483-85; see supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
187. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). Metro Broadcasting involved Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) policies favoring minority-controlled firms. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 547
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Protection Clause requires the government to treat citizens "as individuals, not
as simply components of a racial, religious, or national class."'88 In Miller,
as in Shaw, the Court seemed especially concerned with the specter of legis-
lative stereotyping, "the offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a
particular race, because of their race, 'think alike, share the same political
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls."" 9 The Court ex-
plained that Shaw required no threshold showing that the district in question is
"bizarre" on its face.'" The Court did note, however, that the shape of the
district is relevant in that it provides "persuasive circumstantial evidence that
race for its own sake" was the legislature's primary focus in creating the
district's boundaries. 9'
The Court summarized Shaw as applying strict scrutiny jurisprudence to
the redistricting arena. 92 In the context of redistricting, strict scrutiny may
attach in one of two ways. In some cases, the discriminatory intent will be
obvious from the otherwise inexplicable shape of the district. 93 Such was the
case in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,"94 where the boundary of Tuskegee, Alabama,
was drawn to exclude almost every African-American from city citizen-
ship.'9 Districts blatantly designed to preclude any rational explanation other
than discriminatory intent would be analogous to the line of cases stemming
from Yick Wo v. Hopkins,9" in which the Court declared even facially "neu-
tral" laws applied in a racially-hostile manner unconstitutional. 97 More com-
monly, the district will not be so bizarre as to brook no explanation other than
racial segregation. In those cases, the Court must examine the weight given to
race in relation to other, more traditional districting principles.' 98 These so-
called "race-neutral" principles include compactness, contiguity, and respect
for political subdivisions.'"
The Court acknowledged that legislatures attempting to draw district
boundaries face a difficult task.2" While racial considerations will "almost
always" be a factor in the redistricting process, they must not be the predomi-
nant factor.2"' Because of this tension, state legislatures are accorded a pre-
sumption of good faith, and the courts must use "extraordinary caution" when
faced with a claim of racial gerrymandering.2"' The Court explicitly rejected
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Court found the FCC's interest in "enhancing broadcast diversity"
to be a sufficient basis for the favorable practices. Id. at 567.
188. Id. at 602 (quoting Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred
Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983)).
189. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486 (quoting Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827) (emphasis added).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2487.
193. Id.
194. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
195. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341; see supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
196. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
197. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74, cited in Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2487.
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the idea that "individuals of the same race share a single political interest,"
stating that such a view is "based on the demeaning notion that members of
the defined racial groups ascribe to certain 'minority views' that must be dif-
ferent from those of other citizens. 21 3
The Court then outlined the plaintiff's burden in claiming that a redistrict-
ing plan violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff must prove that the
legislature allowed racial considerations to dominate race-neutral districting
principles, including compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivi-
sions or "communities defined by actual shared interests."2 4 However, a
state may defeat the gerrymandering claim by showing that "race-neutral con-
siderations are the basis for redistricting legislation, and are not subordinated
to race.'21
The majority relied heavily on what it called Georgia's "own concessions"
that it had given preference to race over other considerations."' For exam-
ple, when the Justice Department rejected the legislature's second redistricting
plan and renewed its insistence on a third majority-minority district, the State
Attorney General objected on the grounds that creating such a district would
force the State to "violate all reasonable standards of compactness and conti-
guity."2"7 The legislature admittedly would not have added part of the Elev-
enth District "but for the need to ... offset the loss of black population
caused by the shift of the predominately black portions of Bibb County in the
Second Congressional District.""2 The legislature also conceded that increas-
ing the minority voting population was a "substantial reason" for splitting
certain precincts in the Eleventh District.2" Finally, Georgia did not dispute
the assertion that the Eleventh District was the "product of a desire by the
General Assembly to create a majority black district. 2 '
The Supreme Court blamed the Justice Department. The Court agreed
with the lower court that it "became obvious" the Justice Department would
be satisfied with "nothing less than abject surrender to its maximization
203. Id. at 2487 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). The
problem with this reasoning is that no two individuals are likely to share a "single political inter-
est," much less an entire political unit, however defined. Justice Kennedy's reasoning would leave
any electoral scheme short of a straight democracy constitutionally questionable.
204. Id. at 2488 (emphasis added).
205. Id. The Attorney General's statement should not be considered dispositive on this issue.
It is understandable that the State of Georgia would wish to avoid the time and expense of draft-
ing and submitting a third redistricting plan; however, the Attorney General's words were hyper-
bole. In fact, the third majority-minority district was created, and it is not an egregious violation
of the traditional principles of redistricting. The characteristics of the Eleventh District are similar
to those of districts throughout the state. As noted by the dissent, Georgia's Eleventh District does
not even make the "Top 28" list of the most bizarre districts in the United States. Richard H.
Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating
Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 565 (1993).
206. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2489.
207. Id. at 2489-90, citing app. 118.
208. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1377 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (per curiam), affd, 115 S.
Ct. 2475 (1993).
209. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2489.
210. Id.
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agenda.""' The Court soundly chastised the Justice Department for denying
preclearance until the legislature had adopted a proposal similar to the
ACLU's suggested "max-black" plan.2 2 The plan called for the creation of
three majority-minority districts, which the lower court regarded as an attempt
to "secure proportional representation for the black population."2 3  The ma-
jority found this increase in majority-minority voting districts unnecessary
under the "substantive provisions" of the VRA.2 4 The Court rejected the as-
sertion that states have a "compelling interest in complying with whatever
preclearance mandates the Justice Department issues."2 '5 The majority also
refused to accept the Justice Department's assessment that the Eleventh Dis-
trict needed to be drawn, insisting that the judicial branch has an "independent
obligation" to evaluate the necessity of the proposed measures.2 6 The Court
adamantly refused to "surrender[] to the Executive Branch [its] role in enforc-
ing the constitutional limits on race-based official action."2 7 Unlike the Jus-
tice Department, the majority of the Supreme Court found no need for the
creation of the Eleventh District. The Court reasoned that both of Georgia's
prior proposed plans were ameliorative,' s so they could not have violated
the VRA's nonretrogression standard.2 9 The Court also rejected the argu-
ment that Georgia's plan was justified on the grounds of correcting past dis-
crimination, because the state had failed to show "a strong basis in evidence"
of that discrimination.220
2. The Miller Dissents
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that Georgia did not in fact elect
a black Congressman from Reconstruction until 1972-hardly a compelling
argument for the State's unfailing commitment to minority representation.22'
Furthermore, race was substantially the only factor considered in Shaw, not
merely the primary one. In Miller, by contrast, the district at issue "re-
flect[ed] significant consideration of 'traditional districting factors ... and the
usual political process of compromise and trades for a variety of nonracial rea-
sons."' 23 For example, the DeKalb County portion of the Eleventh District
was drawn to include the precinct in which an incumbent State Senator's son
lived.224 Georgia's Eleventh District is not even on the "statistically
211. Id.
212. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2484.
213. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1360.




218. Meaning they increased the number of minority voting districts. Beer v. United States,
425 U.S. 130 (1976); see supra note 99 and accompanying text.
219. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2492; see also Beer, 425 U.S. at 141-42 (establishing non-retrogres-
sion standard).
220. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2492.
221. Id. at 2501 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 2502.
223. Id. at 2502-03 (quoting Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1397, n.5 (1994)
(Edmondson, J., dissenting)).
224. Id. at 2503.
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calculated list of the 28 most bizarre districts in the United States. 225 Joined
in various parts by Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Souter, Justice Ginsburg's
dissent argued the dangers of a "strict scrutiny" test that will be "triggered not
only when traditional districting practices are abandoned, but also when those
practices are 'subordinated to'-given less weight than-race. "226
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens noted the fatal shortcoming of both
Shaw and Miller: In neither did the Court adequately explain the precise harm
it sought to remedy.227 Stevens pointed out the logical fallacy in the
majority's reason for wanting to grant the plaintiffs relief: The assumption that
a minority candidate elected in a majority-minority district will only represent
the interest of his or her racial group suggests the same sort of stereotypes and
generalizations the majority purportedly finds unacceptable. 28 Because he
failed to find a sustainable injury suffered by the plaintiffs, Stevens felt the
claim should have been dismissed.
29
The dissenters outlined several points upon which all members of the
Court did agree. First, political districting is, in general, within the province of
the state legislature. Second, minorities have historically suffered discrimina-
tion in the political arena, and the Equal Protection Clause and the Voting
Rights Act give such traditionally disfranchised groups a remedy against "state
action that dilutes minority voting strength. '23. Third, race is often and legiti-
mately considered by state legislatures in districting plans.2 1' Finally, "state
legislatures may recognize communities that have a particular racial or ethnic
makeup, even in the absence of any compulsion to do so, in order to account
for interests common to or shared by the persons grouped together.
' 23 2
The dissenters took issue with the majority, however, in defining how
much weight state legislatures could give racial considerations before implicat-
ing the Equal Protection Clause.233 In short, Miller leaves open the possibili-
ty that "a federal case can be mounted whenever plaintiffs plausibly allege that
other factors carried less weight than race. 234
IV. SHAW AND MILLER: ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
A. "Black and White"-Or Shades of Grey?
Race as an Immutable Characteristic
The Supreme Court faced a difficult decision. In the absence of clear
evidence of discriminatory intent,235 districting decisions become largely a
225. Id. at 2504 (citing Pildes & Niemi, supra note 205).
226. Id. at 2499-2500.
227. Id. at 2497 (Stevens, J., dissenting).





233. Id. at 2500 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 2505.
235. Of the sort described in supra note 35 and accompanying text.
19951
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
question of perspective. From the perspective of the state legislature, the cre-
ation of a third majority-minority district was necessary both to satisfy the
demands of the Justice Department and to remedy long-standing disparities in
minority voting opportunity for Georgia's twenty-seven percent African-Amer-
ican population."' The legislators can hardly be blamed for responding with
righteous indignation to the claim that they had essentially engaged in reverse-
discrimination. On the other hand, the "white" voters, perhaps less inclined to
see a problem with the status quo, resented having their voting strength "sub-
jugated" to what they perceived as an artificially-constructed majority. Both
points of view may be argued with integrity, and it does the political system a
disservice to merely dismiss one side or the other as "wrong."
In its rejection of Georgia's districting plan as remediation, the Court
embraced a double standard. In Shaw, the Court inferred from the mere shape
of a district legislative intent to discriminate. In Miller, however, the Court
failed to recognize the systemic bias inherent in Georgia's well-documented
history of actual discrimination, including the state's failure to elect an Afri-
can-American congressperson in over one hundred years." 7 The Court seems
to pick and choose its presumption without the benefit of a clear standard for
doing so. This trend is alarming, because the Court seems to prefer inferences
which contradict the original purpose of the VRA-and, perhaps, even the
Constitution.23
In addition, both the Georgia state legislature and the United States Su-
preme Court fatally misconceive the concept of "race" in our society. Justice
Kennedy and his cohorts toss around the terms "black" and "white" as if they
still retained some independent descriptive significance. With the exception of
very limited239 segments of the population, we recognize that the designa-
tions "black" and "white" refer only to differences in skin pigmentation." °
We have moved beyond the days when "blacks" were thought to be physiolog-
ically distinct from "whites" in any meaningful way. This may in part explain
why the term "black" has gradually given way to "African-American" in
236. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483.
237. See supra note 221.
238. It is difficult to believe the Framers intended the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
as tools for majority protection or, as Lani Guinier terms it, a "permanent majority hegemony."
Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral
Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077 (1991) [hereinafter Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism].
239. "Limited" here refers both to numerical density and mental capacity.
240. Between 50% and 70% of anthropologists reject race as a "biological category." Sharon
Begley, Three Is Not Enough, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 1995, at 67, 67. For a discussion of race-as-
social construct in the legal context, see, e.g., Trino Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality:
Tools to Dismantle the Master's House, 10 BERKLEY WOMEN'S L.J. 16, 24 (1995) ("To begin
with, we must fully understand that race is not a biological concept, but a social and historical
construct."). Lopez, supra note 5, provides probably the best review of racial identity as a social
construct. Lopez first rejects the existence of "biological race," the concept that "there exist natu-
ral, physical divisions among humans that are hereditary, reflected in morphology, and roughly but
correctly captured by terms like Black, White, and Asian." Id. at 6. Lopez notes the absence of
any "genetic characteristics possessed by all Blacks but not by non-Blacks," or vice versa, and that
"greater genetic variation exists within the populations typically labeled Black and White than be-
tween these populations." Id. at 11-12 (citations omitted). In summary, Lopez states simply: "Bio-
logical race is an illusion." Id. at 61.
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popular speech. Both are society's shorthand way of describing a perceived
heritage and community of interest; the phrase "African-American" simply
better captures this distinction.
When the Georgia legislature drew the Eleventh District, it did not care
about the concentration of melanin in each voter's skin. The fact that the
majority of the inhabitants of the Eleventh District would be "black" in the
basest sense of the word was of no significance as such. The legislators were
attempting to identify and accommodate a group of voters with what they
perceived as similar interests, perspectives, and needs. Redistricting is by
definition a process of stereotyping. 4 ' When legislatures create districts, they
do so based on the assumption that people of particular religious, ethnic, so-
cioeconomic, ideological, and geographic groups will vote in similar ways.
Some African-Americans may, indeed, vote in identifiable patterns-as do
(some) Catholics, (some) feminists, and (some) Midwesterners. These patterns
emerge, not because the voters are "black" or "Catholic" or "female" or "Mid-
western," '242 but because they happen to share with other voters a common
history, shared political goals, and group economic interests.24 When the
Georgia legislature admitted to creating districts based on these electoral simi-
larities,2 it was not admitting to racial discrimination. It was acknowledging
political reality. The Eleventh District was not drawn to segregate voters, but
to tap into a real and identifiable community of interest which coincided with
race. Under the Constitution, the VRA, and case law to date, drawing district
lines to reflect legitimate communities of interest is perfectly constitution-
al.245
The Supreme Court dismissed the State's argument to this effect as "mere
recitation of purported communities of interest."2" The Court acknowledged
that Georgia was free to recognize minority-majority communities, provided
the communities had "some common thread of relevant interests"; however,
the Court recognized no "tangible communities of interest" in the Eleventh
District.247 The Supreme Court apparently discounted the suggestion that two
hundred years of slavery followed by a violent and bloody struggle for em-
powerment constitute a continuing "thread" of interests at least equal to that of
241. "[T]o meet statutory requirements, state legislatures must sometimes consider race as a
factor highly relevant to the drawing of district lines." Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2500 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
242. The author uses quotes here in recognition of the fact that no individual is uni-dimen-
sional.
243. At first blush, this would seem contrary to the Court's position in Reynolds: "Citizens,
not history or economic interests, cast votes." Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 580. In context, however, it
becomes apparent that the Court intended this maxim to apply in the limited area of district popu-
lation inequity: "[Nleither history alone, nor economic or other sorts of group interests, are per-
missible factors in attempting to justify disparities from population-based representation." Id. at
579-80 (emphasis added).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 206-10.
245. See, e.g, Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578-79 ("A State may legitimately desire to maintain the
integrity of various political subdivisions ... and to provide for compact districts of contiguous
territory in designing a legislative apportionment scheme.").
246. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490.
247. Id.
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"whites" who share little common ancestry but happen to live next door to one
another."4
If African-Americans tend to vote as a bloc on certain issues, they do so
for the same reasons as do the members of every other sub-group in America.
And yet, if the state legislature had drawn three districts with a slightly Pres-
byterian majority, no Fourteenth Amendment concerns would have been impli-
cated. The Supreme Court examines voting districts drawn along racial lines
with a degree of scrutiny not accorded to any other voting group classifica-
tion.249 The next section of this Commentary criticizes strict scrutiny as a
method for overturning State apportionment decisions.
B. Race as a Non-Suspect Class in Redistricting
Many scholars reject the Shaw-majority view that African-Americans have
"little in common with one another but the color of their skin," ''5 insisting
instead that African-American voters share at the very minimum a common
culture and history of suppression."s' The cultural and historical link shared
by minority groups may result in racially "polarized" voting; that is, "absent
compelling reasons to do otherwise," minorities and nonminorities tend to vote
for candidates of "their own racial/ethnic background." '252 Social science re-
searchers have repeatedly demonstrated that race does matter in the voting
arena, at least in certain circumstances. One 1990 study suggested that race
has a "pervasive influence" on voting behavior, and that "white" voters are
more likely to "vote white" the more serious and hotly-contested the
election. " When statisticians look at ethnic voting patterns, however, they
may really be tapping into those same communities of interest discussed
above. For example, there is some suggestion that minority candidates may in
fact represent minority interests more effectively than do non-minority candi-
dates. Lani Guinier's assertion that "[a]uthentic" leadership for blacks is
248. The Court based its conclusions on a "comprehensive" report concerning the "fractured
political, social and economic interests" present in the Eleventh District. Id. The Court's reliance
on this study is misplaced, however, in that it begs the question of how homogenous the "white"
voters in the Eleventh District would appear if evaluated on the same criteria.
249. In Reynolds, however, Chief Justice Warren compared geographic vote dilution to racial
discrimination and stated that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees extend to persons of "all
places as well as all races." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); see supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
250. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
251. See generally Higginbotham et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions with
Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593 (1994) (arguing that "[b]lackness is
culturally and politically relevant," in part because it denotes a shared heritage of slavery and
victimization); see also Anthony R. Chase, Race Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield
to the Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1995) (suggesting that "in noticing race, we perceive
much more than simply color. We perceive, and thereby project, a set of qualities. This is ... a
necessary and heuristic practice that helps us to tentatively organize our reactions to safe and
dangerous situations."). Id. at 44. See also Lopez, supra note 5, at 14-15 (noting the fact that skin
color is gradated and that "race is not a function of skin color alone"). Lopez feels that "[rlace
must be viewed as a social construction." Id. at 27.
252. Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 238, at 1112.
253. Jack Citrin et al., White Reactions to Black Candidates: When Does Race Matter?, 54
PUB. OPINION Q. 74-96 (1990).
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provided only by those who are "politically, psychologically, and culturally
black,"" 4 finds support in at least one study. A 1993 study looked at Afri-
can-American mayors and their constituents and found that "black-owned
firms in cities with black mayors have higher total revenues, greater average
sales revenues, and lower rates of failure compared to black-owned firms in
cities with no black mayor." '255 For whatever reason this may be true, it is
disingenuous for the Court to take the position that minorities have no com-
mon interest beyond skin pigmentation.
In the voting arena, "race" cannot rationally be considered synonymous
with skin color. An African-American voter's "race"-the amalgam of beliefs,
experiences, and perspectives that inform his or her behavior in the voting
booth-is the product of a lifetime of being an African-American. As such, it
is subject to change. When an African-American casts a vote for a particular
candidate, he or she is making a conscious decision based on a myriad of
circumstances and opinions. That decision is not dictated by the color of the
voter's skin. Therefore, in the narrow context of redistricting, the Supreme
Court is in error when it considers race an immutable characteristic. An indi-
vidual may not be able to change her skin color, but she can change her mind.
In the voting booth, race is an intellectual choice." 6
The Court's misconceptions concerning race lead it to erroneously apply
strict scrutiny where none should attach. The Georgia legislature did follow
traditional districting principles in creating the Eleventh District, and these
principles were not subordinated to the Court's mythical conception of race-as-
skin-color. Because the Georgia legislature based its decisions on
constitutionally permissible considerations-and not on the immutable charac-
teristic of skin color-its actions should not have been reviewed under height-
ened scrutiny. The appropriate level of review for routine legislative decisions
is mere rationality, meaning the State need only show that its action was ratio-
nally related to a legitimate government purpose.257 Georgia's interest in pre-
serving the state's African-American community of voters is enough to survive
this standard.
The Court's misapplication of strict scrutiny effectively undermines the
original goal of the doctrine. Recent decisions by the current Court reflect a
trend toward using strict scrutiny to subvert, rather than to encourage, minority
gains by applying strict scrutiny to "benign" racial classifications."' The
Court's language and reasoning in Miller underscore the growing tension
between the VRA and the Fourteenth Amendment. 259 The Court failed to ad-
dress the question of whether compliance with the VRA is a sufficient state
254. Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 238, at 1103.
255. Timothy Bates & Darrell L. Williams, Racial Politics: Does It Pay?, 74 Soc. Sc. Q.
507-21 (1993).
256. See, e.g, Lopez, supra note 5, at 47 (arguing that "in racial matters, we constantly exer-
cise choice"). Lopez points to the phenomenon of "passing"--moving from one racial group to
another-as a powerful indicia of "race's chosen nature." Id.
257. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (requiring only a "reasonable
basis" for limiting AFDC grants).
258. See supra note 28 for a brief discussion of this trend.
259. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2493.
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interest to satisfy strict scrutiny. More troubling still, the Court explicitly ques-
tioned the VRA's constitutionality: "The Justice Department's implicit com-
mand that states engage in presumptively unconstitutional redistricting brings
the Voting Rights Act . . . into tension with the Fourteenth Amendment. '
The Court gives the impression it is not fond of the VRA, and would not
hesitate to remove whatever teeth the Act has left at the first appropriate op-
portunity. The VRA was designed as a remedial measure, and remedial mea-
sures have fallen into disfavor with the current Court. It may be only a matter
of terms before the Court overturns the entire VRA as unconstitutional and re-
turns redistricting power solely to the states.
C. Shaw v. Reno and Miller v. Johnson:
Expressive Harms and the Great White Cause of Action
What, precisely, is the Court trying to do in Shaw and Miller? While
"whites" constitute seventy percent of the population in this country, they hold
eighty-three percent of the congressional seats.26 What harm, then, have they
suffered when, on a local level, they are forced to confront a prospect faced
by millions of minority voters in every election-backing a candidate destined
to lose? Richard Niemi and Richard Pildes make a compelling argument that
the Supreme Court is trying to address what they refer to as "expressive
harms."'262 An expressive harm is one which grows out of the government's
apparent endorsement of a moral wrong.263 The Supreme Court does not
want to acknowledge race as an acceptable factor upon which to base political
decisions." The Court must rule against congressional districting that subor-
dinates all other factors to race, or risk being seen as endorsing racial distinc-
tions.265 Similarly, Stanley Halpin, Jr. suggests that perhaps the Supreme
Court has recently decided two types of redistricting cases-those in which the
Court recognizes principles, and those in which it implements them.2" In
particular, Halpin thinks that Shaw "may well suffer the fate of being a princi-
ple recognition opinion without a follow-up implementation opinion. As such,
it may be principally remembered as a moral statement in support of color-
blind districting." '267
As profoundly as the Court has redefined redistricting law within the past
few years, it has expressly avoided taking several possible avenues of
260. Id.
261. ACLU, supra note 118, at 11.
262. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 205, at 506.
263. Id. at 507.
264. Id. at 519-20.
265. Some scholars have argued that taking such a position results in a worse harm, however.
See Higginbotham et al., supra note 251, at 1638 (arguing that having an unrepresentative Con-
gress undermines the confidence of minorities in their government).
266. Stanley A. Halpin, Jr., Waves and Backwashes in Voting Rights Law: Recognition With-
out Implementation of a New Principle Opposing Gerrymandering, 22 S.U. L. REv. 255, 258-59
(1995). A case such as Baker v. Carr would, for example, be an instance of "principle recogni-
tion," with the "principle implementation" coming only later in Reynolds v. Sims. Id.
267. Id.
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change. 2" Shaw did nothing to alter the traditional vote dilution claim as ar-
ticulated in cases such as Gingles.269 Shaw did not recognize a constitutional
cause of action based solely on the shape of the district in controversy, nor did
it imply that race may never be considered in districting decisions. In fact, the
Court has declined to assert that the creation of any majority-minority districts
above the bare requirements of the VRA will always be invalid.7 In addi-
tion, the Court in Shaw explicitly reserved ruling on the question of whether
"'the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more' always
gives rise to an equal protection claim."27'
Shaw is a problematic decision. It "fits uncomfortably" into voting rights
activism and raises the issue of VRA unconstitutionality.272 One possible
interpretation for the rulings in Shaw and Miller is that the Court is attempting
to create a "white" cause of action. "White" voters, even when they form the
minority in a particular district, are generally unable to articulate a reasonable
vote dilution claim, because they still elect the majority of the representatives
in the nation as a whole, nor are they members of a suspect class. Shaw and
Miller give nonminority voters a previously unavailable means of access to the
courts. Both decisions, however, fail to definitively establish that such access
is both necessary and justified.
In Miller, the Court implies that equal protection claims may be valid
even when legislatures use race as only one of several factors taken into con-
sideration. Even if the traditional criteria for redistricting are observed-that
is, if the districts are compact, contiguous, equal in population, and drawn
along community lines-the Court may decide that the redistricting plan is
illegal if there is evidence, either in the legislative history or simply based on
the demographics of the district, that race was taken into account in creating
the districts. Legislators must walk a fiber-thin tightrope between the section 5
of the VRA vis-A-vis the Justice Department and the judicial branch. Under
the VRA, states are compelled to take steps to ameliorate the racial evils of
the past; thus, the VRA "not only permits, but requires policymakers, in cer-
tain specific circumstances, to be race conscious when they draw electoral
district lines." '273 Under Miller, however, they are practically forbidden to do
so. As a result, we are left unsure of what our voting rights are. Everyone
agrees that an individual is entitled to have his or her vote count as much as
the next person's, and that state legislatures have a moral as well as legal duty
not to reduce the efficacy of that vote by placing it in unfairly-drawn districts.
Unfortunately, however, our political system operates on a "winner take all"
philosophy: The candidate with the most votes gets the congressional seat, and
the runner-up gets, well, nothing. The next section examines whether this
system has perhaps outlived its usefulness.
268. See, e.g., Pildes & Niemi, supra note 205, at 494-96.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 121-25.
270. Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1156 (1993).
271. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2828 (1993).
272. "If racial gerrymandering is unconstitutional, where does that leave statutes like the
VRA?" Polsby & Popper, supra note 20, at 654.
273. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 205, at 486.
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V. LOOKING AHEAD: DAWN AND THE PATH HOME
After thirty-some-odd years in the political thicket, the United States
Supreme Court has yet to settle on an equitable means by which political
boundaries may be drawn. "Equality" cannot be defined through a "focus on
numbers alone. 2 74 Tensions flare over the debate, and old wounds are re-
opened. Each side can argue with a fair degree of moral conviction. The ques-
tion for both groups is, "How long?" For the minority-how long until we are
given a meaningful voice in electoral politics? For the majority-how long
must we pay for the sins of our fathers? The political process in this country
has reached an impasse, and we are left with the sole choice of inertia or
change.27
Probably the most widely-supported alternative to the current American
political system is proportional representation (PR). Advocated by the likes of
Lani Guinier,276 PR means what it says: Representatives are elected in pro-
portion to the number of votes they receive.277 "In PR, a party or candidate
does not have to get a majority or plurality of the vote to win office. A small
party might only get 15 percent of the vote, but it would still get 15 percent of
the seats in the legislature." '78 In short, "[p]roportionate interest representa-
tion is an attempt to construct a deliberative decisionmaking body that repre-
sents, in proportion to their presence in the population, minority group inter-
ests, not minority group voters. '2 79 In other words, any group of voters able
to amass 1% of the vote in any given election would be able to seat a can-
didate of its choice.
PR would seem to solve a number of pressing voting rights concerns.
Voters who find themselves consistently in the minority are left with only
"virtual representation"--that is, representation by a candidate they did not
select, but who presumably has "common interests and sympathies.""28 Abi-
gail Thernstrom has suggested that "one can be represented in a political re-
gime in which one has no actual participatory role" 28'-virtual representa-
tion-but Professor Guinier rejects this view.282 Basing progress in minority
empowerment on raw "black electoral success" has two flaws: First, it misses
the point that the civil rights movement sought to ensure "favorable policy
outcomes, not just fairness in the struggle for a seat at the bargaining ta-
ble." '283 Second, it erroneously assumes that "technical access" to the polls
274. THERNSTROM, supra note 3, at 77.
275. "The American political system is at a fork in the road.... Short of a paradigm
shift ... the terms of the argument leave a familiar choice: single-member districts, at-large elec-
tions, or some form of proportional representation." Polsby & Popper, supra note 20, at 664.
276. LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRE-
SENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994).
277. AMY, supra note 13, at 8.
278. Id.
279. Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 238, at 1148 (emphasis added).
280. Lani Guinier, Keeping the Faith, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 427-29 (1989).
281. Id.
282. Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 238, at 1126-27.
283. Id. at 1134.
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equals "meaningful access." '284 Professor Guinier questions the "fundamental
fairness" of a "political system whose legitimacy is based solely on the con-
sent of a simple, racially homogenous majority. 28 5
PR would presumably ameliorate these effects. One of the main problems
with our current districting system is that it "assumes geography is an ade-
quate proxy for interests"2"6 when, in reality, "principles of interest propor-
tionality may provide better proxies for political fairness."287 Professor
Guinier contends that "geographical districting wastes votes 288 because the
theoretical forty-nine percent that do not vote for the winning candidate have
no voice in the political process. Thus, she advocates "modified at-large sys-
tems," under which, "[diepending on the exclusion threshold, politically cohe-
sive minority groups are assured representation if they vote strategically. 289
Under this system, an interest bloc with less than fifty-one percent of the
vote could achieve representation. Each individual voter would be given a set
number of votes which could be divided among several candidates or used
aggregately for a single candidate, a concept known as "cumulative vot-
ing.''2' Thus, "[r]acial-group interests become those self-identified, voluntary
constituencies that choose to combine because of like minds, not like bod-
ies."29' Such a process has the advantage of allowing "all voters ... the po-
tential to form voluntary constituencies based on their own assessment of their
interests. '292 In this system, "[e]verybody's vote" would "count for
somebody's election, '293 making minority groups "necessary participants" in
the political process by "giving [them] additional bargaining power" and "veto
power" on important issues.2 94 Proportionate representation would make leg-
islators "accountable to a larger, more heterogeneous electorate, '295 because
they would not be obligated by the nature of the system to pander to majority
interests alone.
Guinier is not alone in her advocacy of proportional representation. Doug-
las J. Amy argues that PR would help eradicate gerrymandering, encourage
more issue-oriented campaigns, and lead to fairer representation for minorities
and women296 because fewer votes would be required to elect a candidate to
represent their "narrow" interests. Amy suggests a number of ways in which
PR might be implemented in this country.297 For state legislatures, Amy
284. Id. at 1135.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1147.
287. Id. at 1137.
288. Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the
Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1606 (1993).
289. Id. at 1632-33 (internal footnotes omitted).
290. Id. at 1617.
291. Id. at 1633.
292. ld.
293. Id. at 1634.
294. Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 238, at 1144.
295. Id. at 1145.
296. See generally AMY, supra note 13 (discussing the advantages of proportional representa-
tion for minority interest groups).
297. Id. at 183-97.
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advocates a "double ballot system" under which voters would cast votes "in
local district contests between individual candidates," and also for "an entire
party slate.""29 The winners from each ballot would form half of the legisla-
tive body."9 For the U.S. House of Representatives, Amy advocates a single-
transferable vote system of the sort currently used in Ireland, Australia, and
Cambridge, Massachusetts.3" Under this system, voters rank the candidates
on the ballot in order of preference. A quota or threshold number of top-
ranked votes are required before a candidate could be elected. Once a particu-
lar candidate receives the requisite number of votes, however, "the surplus bal-
lots are redistributed to the next available preferred candidate indicated on the
ballot" and "the votes ... recounted to see if any remaining candidates have
reached the threshold. If no candidates reach the threshold during a counting
round, the last place candidate [would be] eliminated, and those votes...
redistributed to the second-choice candidates .... until all seats are filled.,
30'
Other options for creating political subdivisions might include
"nonterritorial principles of organization" termed "printout districts."3 2 A
printout district is drawn from computer-generated lists of voters "compiled
according to any number of principles or by no principle-that is, random-
ly. 30 3 Printout districts could represent people by race, religion, sex, profes-
sional affiliations, or interests: "The possibilities are endless. 30 4
To date, case law and commentary have failed to suggest any workable
solution to this dilemma. The most obvious choice would be to place a grid
over a United States map and trace intersecting horizontal and vertical lines to
form our congressional districts. We have avoided such arbitrary distinctions
based on the assumption that certain groups share common goals and inter-
ests-a small businessperson in a rural fishing village along the coast of
Maine presumably has more in common with his or her similarly situated
neighbors than with an urban apartment-dweller living in downtown Augusta.
These commonalities extend beyond mere geography, and go to the heart and
spirit of the community. Perhaps such distinctions are no longer valid. It may
be that in reality we share more characteristics with those in our socioeconom-
ic strata than we do with our geographical neighbors.
We can leave the thicket-resurrect the political question doctrine3 5 and
allow the Supreme Court to refuse as nonjusticiable reapportionment cases.
We can bum the thicket-scrap our political system in its entirety and start
over, perhaps with proportional representation and cumulative voting. Or, we
can try to map the thicket-to produce concrete, manageable guidelines for
298. Id. at 188.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 18, 188.
301. Id. at 18.
302. Polsby & Popper, supra note 20, at 672.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. A few recent claims have been dismissed as nonjusticiable by virtue of their political
nature. See Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993) (regarding the impeachment of a federal
district judge); see also Dalton v. Specter, 114 S. Ct. 1719, 1720-21 (1994) (plurality opinion)
(involving a claim concerning closure of military base).
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legislatures engaged in the redistricting process. The "mapping" could take the
form of generating random printout districts-nothing but names taken from
voter registration lists-which would be grouped into theoretical districts with
no reference to race or political affiliation. We could leave the current system
in place but draft strict guidelines for what legislatures could and could not
take into account when drawing district lines; that is, we could attempt to
make race a non-issue." ' Finally, we could attempt to institute some sort of
representational cause of action-a claim, perhaps based on the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, that would be available to minorities in a district (whether "white"
or not) when they felt that their group interest needs were not being addressed
by their representative. The possibilities for accommodation are there, but to
acknowledge them we must examine our comfortable, safe, and familiar politi-
cal system critically. The one option not available to us is a continued disre-
gard for and dismissal of the true meaning of ethnicity in our culture.
CONCLUSION
The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act extended the Act for a
period of twenty-five years. By the year 2007, when it will again come up for
congressional consideration, 307 will we as a society have moved past the con-
cept that race is the single most important factor in adequate representation?
The answer depends largely upon the attitude with which we as individuals
engage in the debate. If we are able to set aside our prejudices and self-serv-
ing attitudes and work towards meaningful change, creative and innovate solu-
tions may present themselves. If not, we may be forced to re-examine the very
fabric of our political system in an effort to see other points of view, through
eyes different than our own. Whether compromise can be achieved-whether
the Court can disentangle itself from the political thicket without abandoning
the principles of equality to which it committed itself years ago-remains a
question which will be answered in the coming months and years as we chart
the course for future generations of voters.
Lynett Henderson
306. The recent Adarand decision may be an indication that the Supreme Court is moving to-
ward a more race-neutral interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra note 29 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion of the dangers of "colorblind" jurisprudence, see Chase, supra
note 251, at 49-53.
307. Davidson, supra note 27, at 30.
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